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Chapter 1 Health Reforms in South East Europe 
Will Bartlett, Jadranka Bozikov, Bernd Rechel  
Introduction 
This book aims to contribute to the analysis of health reforms in South East Europe (SEE) . Over the 
past two decades, the health systems of this region have undergone far-reaching reforms, triggered 
by the search for more effective and efficient health care provision, attempts to introduce new 
sources of revenues, upward cost pressures associated with new technologies and population  
ageing, and the overall context of transition from socialist to market economies. Deteriorating 
population health in the early 1990s was another major concern, with life expectancy decreasing in 
several countries of the region, due to the economic collapse in the early years of transition, the 
effects of war and conflict in the Yugoslav successor states, and a breakdown in basic health services 
(Adeyi, Chellaraj et al. 1997; Rechel et al. 2004; Rechel and McKee 2006).  
Health reforms in South East Europe have involved in most cases the creation of social health 
insurance systems, the privatisation of primary health care, and the introduction of family medicine 
delivered by general practitioners. There were also attempts to reduce costs through introducing 
various forms of (quasi-) market arrangements which promoted competition between providers of  
both primary and secondary care. This sometimes resembled reforms seen in the United Kingdom in 
the late-1980s, when the quasi-market model had been promoted by the Thatcher government, 
alongside with a purchaser-provider split and the contracting of services from competing hospitals  
(Le Grand and Bartlett 1993; Ham 1996)(Allen, Turner et al. forthcoming) . Many of these ideas were 
picked up by policy-makers in SEE, both in the early 1990s and thereafter. Policy transfer from 
Western Europe was clearly evident in the number of countries throughout Central and Eastern 
Europe that introduced capitation payment for primary care and payment based on diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs) for secondary care services. In several countries of SEE, however, reforms 
were delayed by various political factors: in Croatia due to the aggression that started in 1991, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to the war that afflicted the country in 1993-95, in Bulgaria and 
Romania due to the lack of firm political agreement on the speed of reforms until about 1997, and in 
Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo) due to lack of any reformist political change during the 
1990s and a virtual freezing of the reform process. In all countries of the SEE region, the transition 
led to severe social and economic disruptions associated with falling levels of GDP during the 1990s , 
2 
 
although in former Yugoslavia this was already preceded by economic crisis and deteriorating 
population health in the 1980s (Kunitz 2004). This economic decline severely impacted the ability of  
governments to organize effective and affordable health systems. After the fall of the Milosevic 
government in Serbia in 2000, and the electoral rejection of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 
government in Croatia, a new wave of reforms began, often assisted by foreign donors.  
Such policy transfer may not always have been appropriate to the countries of the region. Initial ly i t 
seemed that the public were enthusiastic for reforms, especially in the countries of the formerly 
centrally planned economies which were keen for change (Balabanova and McKee 2004). Public 
support for reforms was less apparent in the Yugoslav successor states which already had an 
extensive health system that performed far better than the systems which were in place behind the 
iron curtain (Mastilica and Babic-Bosanac 2002). Since the health reforms – faced with a challenging 
fiscal climate and declining government revenue – often restricted the scope of health care  free at 
the point of use, this outcome may not be surprising. Policy makers too, by and large, supported the 
reforms, especially when they were promoted by such influential international organisations as the 
World Bank. Resistance to the reforms from health professionals, however, was evident in nearly al l  
the countries of the region, and accounts to some degree for delayed reforms in several of the 
countries (Scott, Powles et al. 2011). Often, reforms failed to reach their proclaimed goals or to 
improve the accessibility and quality of health care, and robust evaluations of reform efforts have 
generally been lacking (Rechel and McKee 2009). In the wake of the global economic crisis the  need 
for governments to ‘do more with less’ has become even more urgent, underlining the challenge of  
improving the quality of health care, reducing costs, and ensuring equity and accessibility.  
Many accounts of the economic and social transition in the former socialist countries emphasise the 
importance of path dependency, and the influence of the legacy of the past on contemporary pol icy 
decisions (Rechel 2008). This perspective is also relevant in the case of heath reforms. It is important 
to understand the key features of the health systems which were in place under the socialist systems 
in South East Europe, and in relation to which health reforms in the transition period were designed. 
Two main types of health systems were established under communism in South East Europe : the 
Yugoslav health system  and the Soviet-style Semashko systemin Albania, Bulgaria and Romania . 
There were two main differences between these systems. Firstly, the former was based on a system 
of national health insurance (mainly based on payroll taxes paid by employers and employees and 
on state contributions), while the latter was based on central budget funding (similar to the national  
health systems in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries). Secondly, fami ly 
medicine played an important role in the Yugoslav system, where it was delivered through local 
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polyclinics known as community health centres, whereas family medicine was generally not officially 
recognized or promoted in the Semashko system, which instead relied on a system of specialist 
polyclinics (Svab, Pavlic et al. 2004). In the centrally planned economies the health systems suffered 
from lack of patient rights, low quality of care, and little technological improvement (Kornai and 
Eggleston 2001). On the other hand, they provided universal service and equal access, at least 
formally, since political connections and informal payments could often speed up access to higher 
quality treatment. 
In all these countries, health reforms were carried out following the fall of the communist regimes. 
Broadly speaking, health systems underwent three major changes (Rechel and McKee 2009). Firstly,  
those countries that had relied on taxation as the main mode of financing introduced social 
insurance systems as another source of revenue. Secondly there was an increase in out-of-pocket 
payments, both formal and informal. Formal co-payments were introduced for many services in 
most countries, in an attempt to ration the use of services and control the growth of public 
expenditure. Informal payments have also increased, partly due to the low salaries of medical 
professionals in many of the countries, and building on practices developed under the communist 
regimes. Thirdly there has (at least formally) been an increased emphasis on primary health care and 
a move away from the provision of specialist care at primary level towards family medicine provided 
by general practitioners (GPs). This sometimes had the awkward side effect of providing an incentive 
for primary care physicians to supply less care themselves and instead increase referrals to 
specialists working in hospitals; in response to this development both Bulgaria and Croatia 
introduced limits on specialist referrals. Other changes have been important too. In some countries  
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Romania), some aspects of the health system have been 
decentralised to sub-national units of government, while in others a process of centralisation has 
occurred (Croatia, Macedonia). There has also been a process of privatisation, in particular with 
regard to pharmacies and dental care, but also with regard to primary health care and, increasingly, 
secondary care 
The socialist health system in former Yugoslavia 
The health system of former Yugoslavia had been founded before the Second World War with the 
establishment of public health services under Andrija Štampar and the introduction of health 
insurance organizations. It was based upon a network of community health centres (Dom zdravlje)  
staffed by mixed teams of general practitioners, specialists such as gynaecol ogists, and nurses. In 
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1960, a specialization in family medicine was introduced (Skupnjak and Novosel 1976).Although the 
role of specialists in these community health centres increased during the socialist period, general 
practitioners continued to play an important role1. Typically, within the community health centre, 
primary health care was delivered through seven distinct functions: (a) general practice, (b) 
occupational medicine, (c) pre-school paediatrics, (d) school medicine, (e) gynaecology and 
obstetrics, (f) laboratory diagnostics (including for X-rays) and (g) hygiene and epidemiology (Atun, 
Kyratsis et al. 2007), with community nurses also playing an important role . Secondary care was 
provided in hospitals which had been established alongside the community health centres, but often 
received more funding and were better staffed. Hospital specialists had a higher social  status than 
physicians in primary health care and resources often went into advanced medical equipment for 
hospitals, at the expense of investment in basic equipment for community health centres. 
Under the socialist system in Yugoslavia, health care providers (both hospitals and community health 
centres) were autonomous organisations managed by a director and an elected staff committee  
under the direction of a Supervisory Council  composed of elected representatives of the employees 
and the local community (Shain 1969). Health services were largely free of charge, with the 
exception of some small user fees, such as prescription charges, that were introduced in 1966. The 
health system was financed to about three-quarters through the national insurance system, 
supplemented by budget grants, user fees, and donations from local businesses2. The standard social 
insurance tax rate in 1967 stood at 21 per cent of gross wages, which included a health insurance 
contribution of 5.2 per cent. The health insurance contributions were collected at the district level 
and distributed by district social insurance institutes, which actied as commissioners of services and 
were governed by elected assemblies of insured persons. The provider organisations in each district 
negotiated their budgets with the local social insurance institute (Shain 1969).  
In 1974 the system was further decentralised with the creation of local health parliaments (so-called 
‘self-managing communities of interest’) at the level of republics and communes, bringing together 
representatives of the local community and local businesses. These were in effect local 
commissioners of care; they decided on capital investment and drew up agreements with health 
care providers on the level of services to be provided, subject to minimum standards set at the 
republican level. This arrangement was designed to give greater leverage to preferences of the local  
community over the interests of specialists in hospitals, and to lead to a greater emphasis on 
                                                                 
1 The ratio of specialists to generalists fell  from 1:2 in 1953 to 1:0.8 in 1 984. During the socialist period the 
university of Zagreb became the WHO centre for primary care and technical cooperation among developing 
countries, see:  Himmelstein, D. U., S. Lang, et al. (1984). "The Yugoslav Health System: Public Ownership and 
Local Control." Journal of Public Health Policy 5(3): 423-431. 
2 Farmers were included in the national insurance system for the first time in the 1960s  
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community health services. Owners of small private businesses and self -employed professionals paid 
for health insurance on a voluntary basis. Further decentralisation resulted from a law on health care 
and health insurance passed in Croatia in 1980 which permitted socially-owned businesses to 
contract directly with health care providers, a practice that eventually covered 15% of health 
expenditure in Croatia. These direct contracts funded specialised clinics providing primary health 
care services mainly for the employees of large social-owned companies, bypassing the community 
health centres and establishing what in effect became a ‘parallel health system’ providing high 
quality services to a selected part of the population (Saric and Rodwin 1993). Thus, despite the 
intended emphasis on community health, general practice and preventative services were relatively 
neglected, due to a lack of effective institutional advocates (Himmelstein, Lang et al. 1984). 
Furthermore, there were widespread health inequalities among regions (republics) of former 
Yugoslavia. Decentralisation of the health system seems to have had a mixed impact on health 
outcomes, with regional inequalities in infant mortality increasing between 1950-54 and 1986, 
although regional inequalities in life expectancy at birth decreased over time (Mastilica 1990). 
In order to control costs, which threatened to escalate with the loss of central control resulting from 
decentralisation, the system of co-payments was extended (Simić, Doknić-Stefanović et al. 1988). 
However, cost-sharing had little effect in reducing health expenditure, but led to increased 
inequalities, with higher rates of cost-sharing being introduced in poorer districts in order to raise  
revenues. However, partly due to widespread exemptions, these revenues rarely exceeded three per 
cent of total health expenditure. Some argued that decentralisation had gone too far, and that in 
order to establish control over costs some sort of recentralisation and central s tate control was 
essential (Parmelee 1985; Parmelee 1992). 
Health systems behind the iron curtain 
The health systems in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania developed rather differently to that in 
Yugoslavia during the communist period. In these countries, the he alth system was organised 
according to the so-called ‘Semashko’ model, based on central planning, state ownership and 
command. Health care was provided through hospitals, polyclinics, primary care dispensaries and, in 
rural areas, through single physicians or feldshers (medical assistants). The systems tended to be 
dominated by specialists and hospital-based care, with no clear gate-keeping role for district 
physicians. Health care was provided on the basis of a universal entitlement to care, although , as in 
other areas of the Soviet-style economy, shortages and queues for services abounded. Medical staff 
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were usually poorly paid and had little motivation to improve quality quality of care  (Borissov and 
Rathwell 1996). Resource allocation was determined by planned inputs, such as beds or staff 
numbers, rather than patient needs or the quantity and quality of services provided. Health received 
an overall low priority and a comparatively small proportion of GDP was dedicated to the health 
system. In addition, health care behind the iron curtain remained cut-off from developments in the 
West, both in terms of medical technologies and evidence-based clinical practice (Rechel et al. 
2011).   
In Albania, during the communist period the number of hospitals, hospital beds and physicians per 
population increased significantly. Over half the physicians were non-specialists, indicating a concern 
for primary health care, and every village came to have its own health centre (Gjonca, Wi lson et al .  
1997). With the expansion of organised health services in this poor agricultural country, health 
indicators improved dramatically, with a continuous increase in life expectancy. However, low 
overall investment on health and the isolation of the country from developments in other parts of  
the world caused the quality of health services to fall behind other European countries, so that by 
the end of the 1980s the Albanian health system was in poor shape, with high rates of child and 
maternal mortality compared to neighbouring countries. 
In Bulgaria, life expectancy stagnated during the 1970s and 1980s, as the health system was unable  
to respond to the high cardiovascular disease burden among the population. People increasingly 
preferred self-treatment at home, before visiting the local polyclinic. Access to primary health 
services remained egalitarian, with the probability of consulting a health professional being re lated 
to age and level of illness rather than income (Balabanova and McKee 2002). However, the quality of 
care beyond the primary level varied with income, with the poor being treated in low quality 
facilities. The poor also faced significant difficulties in accessing secondary care services due to 
problems of affordability, bureaucratic procedures, lack of choice and unresponsive staff.   
In Romania the Semashko system of universal health care provision based on central planning, state  
financing and universal provision free at the point of delivery  was introduced in 1949. Private 
practice was forbidden, and primary health care was delivered through dispensaries which were 
administered through local hospitals. Free choice of doctors was introduced in 1983, along with a 
system of co-payments for some ambulatory services. The system functioned well in the early post -
war years, with improved health outcomes resulting from better control of communicable  disease. 
Life expectancy increased steadily between the 1950s and early 1970s, but, similar to Bulgaria, 
largely stagnated in the second half of the 1970s and the whole of the 1980s, with a growing gap to 
gains achieved in Western Europe (Bara, van den Heuvel et al. 2002; Vlădescu et al. 2008). 
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Health reforms during transition 
In Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, where the Semashko-type tax-financed health systems had 
dominated, various systems of social health insurance were established after the fall of communism, 
and health institutions were decentralised, in line with the general aim of transition reforms to 
reduce the power of the central state. In contrast, in the former Yugoslavia the main aim was to 
centralise the already existing yet fragmented and decentralised health insurance institutions so as 
to enhance the power of the newly formed states. This involved transforming the autonomous ‘self -
managed communities of interest’ into centralised state-managed social health insurance funds.  
Popular attitudes towards health reforms and social health insurance varied correspondingly. In 
Romania, an opinion poll carried out in 2000 found that most people were generally happy with the 
reforms, while about one third of respondents thought that the reforms had a negative effect on the 
quality of care (Bara, van den Heuvel et al. 2003). Similarly, in an opinion poll carried out in Bulgaria 
in 2000, Balabanova and McKee (2004) found that most people preferred social health insurance 
over taxation-based financing, a preference deriving from dissatisfaction with the quali ty of  health 
care under the previous system. Over half of respondents also advocated universal state  provision 
free at the point of use (as in the former Semashko system). In contrast, a survey carried out in 1999 
and 2000 in Croatia revealed sharply divided views (Mastilica and Babic-Bosanac 2002). Most 
respondents favoured a social health insurance system, but most also disagreed with the announced 
reduction in the basic service package covered by health insurance.   
As health systems were being reformed throughout the region to meet the challenges of transi tion 
and post-conflict reconstruction, the alarming outflow of skilled medical personnel presented 
another challenge. While this had been a traditional issue facing the former Yugoslavia, which had 
open borders with the West since the mid-1960s, it was a new experience for those countries which 
had previously restricted migration behind the ‘iron curtain’ of their communist systems. As 
Ognyanova documents in this volume (see Chapter 4), this issue has been especially serious in the 
case of Bulgaria. 
Case studies: former centrally planned countries 
Albania 
In Albania, a Health Insurance Institute was established in 1995 to manage a social health insurance 
system which insures for primary health care services, hospital care and part of the price of 
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medicines based on a restricted list. However, a Demographic and Health Survey carried out in 2008-
09 revealed that 70 per cent of respondents were not covered by health insurance, leading to a high 
rate of out-of-pocket payments, estimated to account for around 60 per cent of total health 
expenditure in 2008 (WHO 2011). Pensioners, children, disabled, beneficiaries of social  assistance, 
and people on unemployment benefit are insured through the state budget for a minimum service  
package. Those who are not covered by health insurance often bypass primary care and go straight 
to the accident and emergency services which are required to treat all who show up, leading to 
overcrowding and reduction in service quality. The poor quality of care at primary care level also 
encourages people to bypass this level of care, but Hotchkiss et al. (2005) reported that 
interventions in some areas designed to improve the quality of primary care have reduced the 
extent of such bypassing. 
On the provider side, ownership of primary health care centres and polyclinics in urban areas was 
transferred to the local government, while the hospital sector remains under the administration and 
control of the central government. The public health system consists of about 400 health centres in 
the primary care sector, while there is a hospital in each district, along with twelve regional 
hospitals. Ten years after the civil unrest of 1997 which had resulted in extensive damage to many 
primary care facilities, observers reported that, although many primary health care centres had been 
rehabilitated, many still suffered from lack of running water, electricity and basic equipment 
(Hotchkiss, Piccinino et al. 2007). Primary health care facilities were reported to have li ttle funding 
for maintenance or running costs, apart from those related to salaries.  
Bulgaria 
In Bulgaria, the health reforms introduced in 1989 involved decentralisation of health care 
institutions and permitted the entry of private health care providers (Borissov and Rathwell  1996) . 
However, financing remained the responsibility of the state until 1998 when a Health Insurance Law 
was passed by parliament, with implementation beginning in 2000. A National Health Insurance 
Fund was established to administer and coordinate the work of 28 regional offices. The National 
Health Insurance Fund was funded by payroll contributions by both employers and employees, while 
the self-employed were required to pay the whole contribution themselves. The contributions were 
supplemented by per capita grants from the state and local government budgets , and the 
contributions of retired people and the unemployed were paid by state funds. The reforms 
envisaged that the NHIF as purchaser of health services would guarantee a basic package of care, 
available from competing providers in both the public and private sector. General practitioners were 
paid through both fee-for-service and capitation payments, and were envisaged to act as 
9 
 
gatekeepers to secondary care, although patients were also permitted to access specialists in 
hospitals directly.  
Although it was recognised that the existing system needed improvement, commentators pointed 
out that social health insurance might be financially unsustainable, owing to the low employment 
rate and the high level of informal employment, which would provide a narrow base for raising 
revenue (Pavlova, Groot et al. 2000). These fears were borne out in practice as it became clear that 
the system had some negative impacts on equity of health service provision: firstly, the scope of 
coverage is limited, owing to a continually reduced basic insurance package, and secondly, people on 
low incomes often cannot afford to pay health insurance contributions, effectively excluding them 
from health care provision, a situation which particularly affects the Roma minority (Atanasova, 
Pavlova et al. 2011). Furthermore, in making the transition to a health insurance system in which 
centralised bureaucracy would be replaced by a more pluralistic competitive system, the country 
lacked skilled managers to play the role of purchasers and providers of health care. In an article 
preceding the reforms, Borissov and Rothwell (1996) identified this lack of administrative and 
managerial capacity, along with an underdeveloped information system, as the main difficulties the 
reforms would encounter. 
In Chapter 3 of this volume, Dimova et al. review the Bulgarian health reforms to date. They show 
that, despite the attempt to move towards a more pluralistic system, the health care quasi -market 
has been dominated by the national health insurance fund which is a monopsonistic purchaser of 
services, while there was a large increase in private health financing in the form of out-of-pocket 
expenditures. The system also suffers from significant gaps in the breadth of coverage, excluding a 
significant part of the population, and from overall underfunding, leading to popular dissatisfaction 
with the effects of reforms.  
In Chapter 10, Georgieva and Moutafova show that the hospital sector in Bulgaria has undergone  
profound changes, including the introduction of contracting, the diversification of providers, new 
forms of ownership, strengthened managerial autonomy, new forms of financing and improved 
patient choice. The introduction of a purchaser-provider split and a contracting mechanism 
introduced market or quasi-market conditions into the health sector. However, performance 
management in hospitals is relatively unknown and poorly implemented, so that, even with hospital 
autonomy and quasi-market incentives, health reforms are unlikely to improve either eff iciency or 
effectiveness in secondary health care.  
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Romania 
In Romania, health financing was decentralised at the start of transition through the Public 
Administration Law of 1991, which established 42 district health directorates responsible for funding 
primary care (Bara, van den Heuvel et al. 2002). Reforms during the 1990s were carried out under 
the influence of World Bank projects and advice from the United Kingdom’s King’s Fund. Under the 
previous system, primary care physicians had worked in dispensaries as salaried employees of 
hospitals. Following the reforms, they became general practitioners working in private practices as 
independent operators, contracted by the district health directorates to provide services. GP 
payment changed to a mix of age-adjusted capitation, fee-for-service and bonuses. GPs began to 
perform a gatekeeper role for secondary care, and were allocated their own budgets as ‘fund 
holders’, emulating earlier reforms in the United Kingdom that were subsequently found to have 
failed to improve efficiency or quality of care (Wyke et al. 2003).  
Following adoption of the Law on Social Health Insurance in 1997, the directorates were 
transformed into District Directorates for Public Health and responsibility for financing health care  
was transferred to newly established District Health Insurance Funds. These health insurance funds 
are responsible for collecting contributions from employers and employees and for contracting 
health services from providers in their district. The National Health Insurance Fund administers and 
regulates the health insurance system, establishes the minimum package of care, and is responsible 
for a solidarity fund which redistributes up to 25% of the National Health Insurance Fund’s financial  
resources to underfinanced districts. Social health insurance contributions for the unemployed are  
paid by the unemployment insurance budget, for pensioners from the social security budget, and for 
those with low incomes or on maternity leave by the District Health Insurance Fund itself. Deficits in 
the funds are filled from the state budget. However, in practice not everyone is covered by health 
insurance, as there is a large informal economy in which employers and employees do not pay 
contributions.  
A Law on Hospital Organisations was passed in 1999 which granted autonomy to hospital 
management led by a Council Board. Privatisation has been mainly limited to dentistry and 
pharmacy, although private hospitals have been allowed to operate. The basis of hospital funding 
changed from historic resource inputs to financing based on performance and the profile of the 
hospital. In Chapter 7 of this volume, Scintee et al. argue that the main shortcomings of the reforms 
have been their lack of flexibility and adaptation to specific contexts and conditions, a disregard of  
the specific and complex health needs of the population, and a lack of simultaneous reforms in other 
parts of the health system. They suggest that the new health strategy proposed by the Presidential 
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Commission might enable further progress by placing the patient at the heart of the health system. 
According to the proposed strategy, family doctors would be required to provide a 24-hour service  
by working after-hours in continuous care centres, while hospitals are to be re-organized and a co-
payment system has already been introduced. By taking simultaneous action in both the primary and 
the hospital sector, it is hoped that patients will be more willing to attend primary care clinics , 
decreasing the pressure on hospitals. 
Case studies: health reforms in the Yugoslav successor 
states 
In the Yugoslav successor states several countries introduced primary health care reforms in the 
1990s. Croatia and Macedonia were the first to introduce reforms. At primary care level these  have 
involved the introduction of the private sector into the delivery of health services and the use of 
capitation as a model of payment for primary care teams. Since then, similar reforms have been 
introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo (Simic, Milicevic et al. 2010: 167). At 
secondary care level, hospital ownership has been transformed from social to state ownership, while 
privately owned hospitals have been permitted and been set up in most countries. All Yugoslav 
successor states have also reformed their health insurance system. In the cases of Croatia, 
Macedonia and Serbia they have done so through centralising the previously decentrali sed health 
insurance system, while in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina a new decentralised system 
has been instituted, alongside a centralised system in the Republika Srpska. Kosovo has been alone 
in adopting a tax-financed system. 
Croatia 
The main aims of health reforms in Croatia were to reduce the costs of health services without 
adversely affecting the health status of the population (Mastilica and Chen 1998). The reforms 
involved bringing the health insurance system under central government control ; this occurred in 
1990 with the creation of the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance. A Health Care Act and a Health 
Insurance Act were passed in 1993 under which the services provided by the public health system 
were restricted to a basic package of services, limiting the number of visits to community health 
centres and the number of prescriptions that could be written for each patient. The list of prescribed 
drugs was restricted and a uniform sick-leave rate introduced. Primary care physicians were 
confined to providing a limited standard and quantity of services through ‘utilization control ’.  Cost -
sharing was introduced for almost all services and prescriptions, with exemptions for chi ldren, the 
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unemployed, the elderly, war veterans and other vulnerable groups of the population. Alongside 
compulsory health insurance, a system of voluntary health insurance was introduced for those who 
wished or could afford to supplement the basic package of health care services. Private health 
insurance was permitted for those on highest incomes, covering about one per cent of the 
population.  
Not surprisingly, in view of the replacement of the previous system of health care provision by one 
restricted to a basic package of health services, an opinion survey carried out in 1994 showed that 
people were generally dissatisfied with the outcomes of reforms (Mastilica and Chen 1998). By 1994, 
average expenditure on co-payments had reached five per cent of income in urban areas. The 
distribution of these payments across income groups was highly regressive, with the poor paying a 
share of income six times higher than the rich (Mastilica and Bozikov 1999). Particular dismay was 
registered over the reduced list of prescribed drugs, which increased the burden of out-of-pocket 
payments, especially for lower and middle-income groups (Chen and Mastilica 1998). In Chapter 2 of  
this volume, Miroslav Mastilica summarises the findings of these studies and shows that the level of  
dissatisfaction has not diminished over subsequent years.  
A new health insurance law adopted in 2002, renaming basic insurance as mandatory insurance, 
further restricted the range of benefits covered by the insurance scheme. Opting out of the system 
was prohibited, and the use of private health insurance consequently fell. Co-payment rates were 
increased and widened, and exemptions were reduced. Complementary health insurance was 
introduced to cover the risk of co-payments, an option taken up disproportionately by pensioners 
(Voncina, Kehler et al. 2010). In 2005, ‘administrative charges’ were introduced for all health 
services, including ambulance services. By the end of the 2000s, these restrictive measures had 
turned the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance around from a position of deficit to one of surplus, 
but the effect was to seriously undermine the universal nature of the statutory financing system in 
Croatia. 
On the provider side, primary health care was subjected to a process of privatisation which 
established (or rather extended, as this had also been permitted under the communist regime) a 
system of private practice. General practitioners could become self-employed and del iver services 
under contract with the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance, in premises rented from community 
health centres. By 2001, about four-fifths of primary care practitioners were operating 
independently under contract to the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance, and only one fifth 
remained salaried employees of community health centres (Katic, Juresa et al. 2004) . However, by 
restricting the services which could be provided, and by changing the payment mechanism for 
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primary care physicians to a capitation basis, the reforms removed the incentives for primary care 
physicians to carry out home visits and to make preventive checks among vulnerable groups. 
Although the number of visits to GPs per patient per year increased from 4.7 to 6.0 between 1990 
and 2001, the number of home visits fell continuously and the number of preventive checks stayed 
low at just 0.05, lending some justification to a critique of the capitation model (Katic,  Juresa et al .  
2004: 547). The capitation model also provided an incentive for non-salaried physicians to cherry-
pick young and healthy patients and to discourage registration by more costly patients with chronic 
diseases. This led potentially to gaps in coverage, and it was estimated in 2004 that at least 300,000 
people in Croatia fell through the net of social health insurance (Katic, Juresa et al. 2004: 545). In 
Chapter 14 of this volume Katic et al. propose a payment model for primary care practitioners 
designed to overcome some of these difficulties. Their proposed payment formula consists of  a mix  
of per capita payment (amounting to four-fifths of the income of primary care physicians) and fees 
for service, covering diagnostic and therapeutic procedures and preventive activities (each 
amounting to 10 per cent of income). They argue that this combined model of payment would act as 
an incentive for improving the quality and performance in primary health care.  
A survey carried out in 2003 revealed that significant health inequalities had emerged between low 
and high income groups (Mastilica and Kusec 2005). At the secondary care level, the highly 
centralised model of health financing in Croatia was recognised as a problem and the government 
announced a decentralisation of health financing in 2000. Since counties and county hospitals had 
limited capacity to implement decentralized financing, a training programme was del ivered by the 
Andrija Štampar School of Public Health, called the ‘Healthy Counties’ programme. In Chapter 12, 
Dzakula, Sogric et al. report on the success of this programme. One of the important achievements 
was the creation of a new legal framework for decentralization. The new Health Care Act that was 
announced at the end of 2008 was based at least in part on the  results of the Healthy County 
programme. It provided for the drawing up of annual and triennial plans on prevention and health 
promotion, the development of comprehensive stakeholder collaboration and the establishment of  
county “Health Councils”. The implementation of these changes is currently in progress.  
Macedonia 
In Macedonia, a national Health Insurance Fund was established by the 1991 Health Care Law, based 
on payroll contributions. People with large families (more than 4 additional members) were required 
to pay supplementary insurance contributions (Donev 1999). The law also provided for 
supplementary and voluntary health insurance. The social health insurance system began to function 
in 1994, with compulsory health insurance covering a basic package of health services. However, by 
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1999, only about four-fifths of the population was covered by the social health insurance system 
(Donev 1999), implying a large gap in the breadth of coverage.   
In 1996 the World Bank provided a loan of US$ 19.4 million to support further health reforms. 
Among the aims of the programme was a switch of funding primary care to a capitation basis,  and a 
reform of the co-payment system to fill gaps in funding. Deficits in the Health Insurance Fund were 
covered by transfers from the central government budget. In 2004 amendments were passed on the 
Law on Health Care which provided for the privatization of pharmacies and dental services on the 
basis of leasing facilities from the state. The amendments coincided with the agreement on a  new 
US$ 10 million loan from the World Bank to finance the strengthening of health sector management, 
with a focus on reforms in the provision of day care and primary health care services, as wel l  as on 
improving revenue collection. The Health Insurance Fund began to negotiate contracts with 
hospitals that contained fixed budgets, in an attempt to reduce cost over-runs. The 2001 Ohrid 
Framework Agreement mandated the decentralization of health care responsibilities to the 
municipal level, and representatives of municipalities have begun to be involved in the management 
of primary health care centres (Gjorgjev, Bacanovic, Cicevalieva, Sulevski and Grosse -Tebbe 2006).  
Private practice in primary health care, under contract to the Health Insurance Fund through fee-for-
service payments, was permitted by the 1991 Health Care Law. Unlike in Croatia, private physicians 
work from their own premises; however, these are costly to equip and require greater investment 
than in Croatia where doctors rent their premises from the local community health centre. By 2002, 
around one-fifth of primary care physicians in Macedonia were working in private practice (Nordyke 
and Peabody 2002). While private practices face strong performance incentives linked to their ability 
to charge fees for service and retain income, in the public sector the number of patient visits is 
regulated and capped by the Health Insurance Fund, providing little incentive to treat more patients. 
A survey comparing the performance of public and private primary health care clinics in 1997-8 
found that the private sector had a higher productivity in terms of numbers of patients treated and 
that private clinics tended to be better equipped (Nordyke 2002). The World Bank-funded Health 
Sector Transition project sought to further develop the private sector in the provision of health 
services in Macedonia. One of its key aims was to introduce capitation payment systems into the 
primary care sector. Consultants to the project recommended the rent or outright sale of 
community health centres to the private sector (Nordyke and Peabody 2002). However, due to 
resistance against the reform from health professionals, the capitation system was appl ied only to 
physicians working in the private sector, replacing their previous fee -for-service contracts (World 
Bank 2003).  
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In Chapter 8 of this volume, Lazarevik and Donev argue that the politicisation of Macedonia’s heal th 
system has distorted decision-making on financing hospitals, recruitment of staff, and the hiring and 
firing of directors in public hospitals. Lack of investments in new technologies and equipment, 
deterioration of facilities and low motivation of staff have reduced the quality of care  in the publ ic 
sector. Out-of-pocket expenditure has increased, with a negative impact on access to health care 
providers for lower income groups. The public hospitals are left with large debts and many senior 
health personnel have moved to work in the private sector. The poor conditions in public hospitals 
and government failure to address them have created opportunities for the development of the 
private hospital sector. Private entrepreneurs have invested in new state -of-the-art health facilities,  
and in the latest medical equipment and technology. Thus, the transition has created a two -tiered 
hospital system, composed of an over-politicised and inefficient public hospital system alongside a 
modern private hospital system that relies on out-of-pocket payments. Lazarevik and Donev argue 
that solutions to prevent the collapse of public hospitals should be oriented towards a locally 
tailored transformation of public hospitals into corporate enterprises, through a careful  process of  
privatisation that does not transfer the ownership of facilities to investors. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, during the war, separate health insurance funds had been established in 
areas controlled by the three main ethnic groups, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Under the Dayton 
peace agreement, two sub-national entities were set up to govern the country. The Serb entity, 
Republika Srpska, established its own centralised health insurance fund. In the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina early advice on health reform was provided by the British Know How Fund (Ljubic,  
Hrabac et al. 1999), while the World Bank drafted a health reform programme.   
In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina a Law on Health Care and a Law on Health Insurance 
were adopted in 1997. The latter stipulated that each of the ten Cantons would have their own 
insurance fund. The revenues are raised through a payroll tax, on a compulsory basis. 
Supplementary and voluntary contributions may also be made. In 2001, a separate fund that had 
been established during the war in the Croat-majority Cantons was merged into the general 
arrangements in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The breadth of coverage by health 
insurance has been low, with many population groups falling through the gaps, including refugees, 
some pensioners, and people working in the large informal sector (Deets 2006). Attempts to extend 
population coverage by improving the administration of the system have been resisted by politicians 
and ‘street-level bureaucrats’ at cantonal level, and example of what Deets calls the ‘passive -
aggressive state’ at work.  
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At primary care level, reforms designed to emphasise the role of family medicine were introduced in 
2001. This involved the introduction of family medicine teams, consisting of a doctor and a nurse, in 
community health centres. These teams were contracted under capitation payment by the 
respective health insurance fund, and were gradually introduced on a voluntary basis. By 2005, 
about one quarter of the population was covered by family medicine practitioners (Atun, Kyratsis et 
al. 2007). 
Serbia 
In Serbia, the health system deteriorated significantly during the 1990s under the impact of 
sanctions and an overall economic deterioration. Following the democratic transition which began in 
2000, a set of health reforms has been adopted. A Health Care Law and a Health Insurance Law were 
passed in 2005. The Health Care Law introduced the model of a ‘chosen doctor’ which required 
people to register with a single medical practitioner in a community health centre (Dom zdravlja). 
Ownership and management of community health centres have been decentralised to the municipal 
level, along with responsibility for capital investment, and the distinction between specialists 
working in community health centres has remained in place. Although the reforms were supported 
by significant donor funds, the recommendation of donor organisations to replace the system of 
specialist practitioners at primary level by a system of family medicine was rejected , due to 
opposition from specialist doctors (Simic, Milicevic et al. 2010: 168). The Health Insurance Act 
ensured the continuation of compulsory health insurance as the main statutory source of health 
financing, with priority given to vulnerable groups. The law also supported output-based contracting, 
and the introduction of capitation payment in primary health care. In Chapter 5 of this volume, Simić 
et al. argue that health reforms in Serbia were largely driven by international donor organisations, 
but that resistance by an anti-reform coalition has held back the implementation of reforms. Reform 
delays have also been related to a lack of administrative and managerial capacity in the Ministry of  
Health, the Health Insurance Fund and the community health centres at the local level. The 
deteriorating quality of health services in the public sector has led to the growth of a poorly 
regulated private sector. This has taken on significant proportions and it was estimated that almost 
one-third of health services in 2007 were provided by unregulated private practitioners (Bartlett 
2008). 
In 2009 a Plan for Health Care Development was published that aimed to strengthen the gate-
keeping role of primary care practitioners and improve access to primary health services. In Chapter 
9 of this volume, Jekić et al. argue that Serbia’s health infrastructure, particularly with regard to 
hospital care, is over-sized, inefficient and expensive. The country’s hospitals are generally 
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characterized by excess physical capacity and staff, cumbersome delivery of servi ces, di ff icul ties in 
human resource management, and high levels of medical interventions of sometimes  dubious 
clinical quality. Jekić et al. report on attempts to modernise the hospital system in Serbia. They 
conclude that the process will need to go beyond completion of master plans, that the long 
timeframe involved creates a danger of reform fatigue, and that there is a need to prepare 
stakeholders for a more modern, efficient and patient-centred hospital system led by clinical 
centres. 
Kosovo 
In Kosovo, health reforms were introduced by the UNMIK administration in the immediate 
aftermath of the war in 1999. New policy guidelines drawn up by international policy advisors from 
the World Health Organization (WHO) started from a ‘year zero’ perspective with the aim of 
establishing a new health system in line with an imagined European model. This involved replacing 
the previously existing system of community health centres with a system of (yet to be trained) 
family medicine specialists at primary care level, who would act as gatekeepers to the provision of  
specialised care. Specialised practice at the primary care level was to be abolished. Notwithstanding 
the fact that, following the war, most Serbian medical staff had fled the country, and that the 
Albanian staff who took over had been working for the previous ten years in a parallel health 
system, it was decided to press ahead with the introduction of this new system in a situation of post -
war chaos and emergency. Not surprisingly, the policy to over-ride previously existing arrangements 
led to much resistance. In Decani for example, UNMIK closed down the maternity ward of the 
community health centre, arguing that it would be more efficient to provide maternity services from 
the local district hospital. This led to virulent protests from staff and the local community (Bower 
1999).  
Private practice was legalised, and, in the absence of an effective funding system for the public 
sector, a significant private health sector is emerging in Kosovo (Bartlett 2008). Dean Shuey, the 
WHO’s health policy advisor at the time, later wrote with others that “the health system of Kosovo is 
at risk of being unofficially privatised in an unregulated fashion” and that “there was a lack of 
direction regarding the appropriate mix of public and private funding” (Shuey, Qosaj et al. 2003). 
Objecting to the externally imposed family medicine model, many primary care specialists set up 
their own private clinics, undermining the system of community health centres (now renamed 
‘family medicine centres’) (Percival and Sondorp 2010:8). Under the new system, statutory health 
financing was changed to general taxation, despite the advice of the World Bank to rebuild the 
Health Insurance Fund and re-establish a system of social health insurance. However, due to the low 
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financial capacity of the government, public health expenditure accounted for only 2.4 per cent of  
GDP in 2005 (amounting to a puny €22 per capita), while private health expenditure accounted for 
3.1 per cent (Percival and Sondorp 2010: 9). To support the reforms, a Health Care Commissioning 
Agency was established which was charged with drawing up contracts with provider organisations at 
secondary care level, and signing performance contracts with municipalities for primary care 
provided through their family medicine centres.  
Montenegro 
Health system developments in Montenegro mirrored those in Serbia until Montenegro became 
independent in 2006. Since then, the country has moved to the provision of primary health care  by 
chosen medical practitioners and community health centres. As Ostojić and Andrić in Chapter 15 of  
this volume describe, chosen medical practitioners work as teams in group practices and patients are 
free to choose their doctor and dentist. There are four different categories of chosen medical 
practitioners: doctors for children up to 15 years (paediatricians), doctors for women 
(gynaecologists), doctors for adults, and dentists. More specialist services are provided separately 
and located in community health centres, which act as reference centres of primary health care  and 
provide support to chosen medical practitioners. Primary health care services are paid for based on a 
mixture of capitation payment and payment for health services provided. 
The health system continues to rely on health insurance as the main statutory form of health 
financing. The Health Insurance Fund of Montenegro is responsible for pooling health insurance 
funds and purchasing health services. Population coverage with health insurance is high, reaching 
97% in 2010. The ongoing World Bank-funded Healthcare System Improvement Project aims to 
initiate further steps towards reforming the health system, and aims to stabilize health financing and 
improve the delivery of primary health care.  
Health financing 
In terms of total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP, there are significant differences 
across the region, with generally higher rates in 2008 than in 1995. The highest rates of total  health 
expenditure can be found in the Yugoslav successor states Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and 
Montenegro, even exceeding the EU average. Romania had the lowest total health expenditure in 
2008, amounting to only 4.8% of GDP (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 Total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, WHO estimates, 1995 and 2008 
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Total health expenditure % GDP
1995
2008
 
Source: WHO (2011) European Health for All database, July 2011 edition, Copenhagen: World Health 
Organization Regional Office for Europe 
 
Table 1  Characteristics of health expenditure, 2000 and 2008 
  
General government 
expenditure on health as % of 
total expenditure on health b 
Private expenditure on health 
as % of total expenditure on 
health b 
Social security expenditure 
on health as % of general 
government expenditure on 
health 
Per capita total expenditure 
on health 
(PPP int. $) 
  2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 
Albania 36.1 39.4 63.9 60.6 20.4 38.2 262 569 
Bosnia and Her zegovina 57.6 58.2 42.4 41.8 97.7 95.1 313 937 
Bulgar ia 59.6 57.8 40.4 37.7 12.7 60.3 373 974 
Cr oatia 86.1 84.9 13.9 15.1 97.6 91.0 843 1 553 
Macedonia 57.5 68.2 42.5 31.8 97.4 94.9 520 738 
Montenegr o 69.1 67.0 30.9 33.0 99.0 97.9 446 1 162 
Romania 67.7 78.9 32.3 18.0 89.4 86.6 297 840 
Ser bia 70.1 62.5 29.9 37.5 92.5 92.4 313 867 
Source: WHO (2011) World Health Statistics, Geneva: World Health Organization. 
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Considering the composition of health expenditure, it is striking that in several countries of the 
region private expenditure constituted a major share of total health expenditure in 2008, reaching 
60.6 per cent in Albania, 41.8 per cent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 37.7 per cent in Bulgaria and 37.5 
per cent in Croatia. There are also considerable differences across the region in terms of total 
expenditure on health per capita, with levels in Croatia in 2008 almost three times higher than those 
in Albania (Table 1).   
Social health insurance has been (re-)introduced in all SEE countries apart from Kosovo as the main 
statutory source of health financing and accounts for most government expenditure on health, with 
the exception of Albania, where it only accounted for 38.2% of government expenditure on health in 
2008 (Table 1). Yet, social health insurance is increasingly seen as being inappropriate to transi tion 
economies with ageing populations and large informal sectors. In Croatia for example, the revenue 
base for the social health insurance system has been narrow, due to the low employment rate , and 
the Health Insurance Fund has until recently been in constant deficit. High rates of payrol l  tax  have 
placed an additional cost on labour, reducing the willingness of employers to hire. The high 
contribution rates also encouraged employers to operate in the informal economy. There are also 
equity concerns, as the burden of payment is heaviest on those in formal employment, although 
taxation-based financing also faces the problem of raising revenue in economies with large informal 
sectors. In Croatia, one emphasis of reforms has been on reducing the range of benefits covered by 
health insurance, through for example reducing the range of exemptions and raising the proportion 
of revenues obtained from non-public sources such as patient co-payments. This has been criticized 
as a creeping privatisation of health financing (Voncina, Kehler et al. 2010), although it should be 
noted that private health expenditure constitutes only a small share of total health expenditure in 
Croatia (Table 1). Nevertheless, critics argue that less attention has been given to improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of services provided at both primary and secondary level, which they 
believe would have allowed to offer a wider scope of services, even in an environment of  f inancial 
stringency.  
A study of the effects of introducing social health insurance in 28 transition countries in 1990-2004 
carried out by Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra (2009) found that social health insurance typically 
increased the costs of providing health services, with no evidence of improvements in qual ity. The 
increase in costs appears to be associated with higher salaries of medical practitioners, the 
administrative and transaction costs associated with administering individual insurance accounts , 
and the costs of contracting the provider organisations. No improvements in amenable morbidity 
and mortality were discovered that could be attributed to the introduction of social health 
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insurance, although there was typically a decrease in average hospital length of stay, increased bed 
occupancy rates and an increased rate of hospital admissions. A major reason for the failure of social 
health insurance systems in transition countries were the gaps in population coverage, such as those 
affecting the Roma minority, leading to a greater incidence of cases in which patients had not 
attended primary health care until their illness had progressed to a later stage, requiring avoidable 
(and more costly) hospitalisation. There is also anecdotal evidence that formal sector workers avoid 
signing up for health insurance until they become ill (Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra 2009). 
Population health 
With the collapse of Yugoslavia and the wars of the 1990s, the health systems in all Yugoslav 
successor states came under immense strain. Conditions in many hospitals and community health 
centres deteriorated dramatically, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia which were 
directly affected by the wars, and where enormous damage was inflicted on both health 
infrastructure and medical personnel. Health services in Serbia and Montenegro, although not 
directly affected by war, suffered from the imposition of UN sanctions between 1991 and 1995 
(Black 1993). Despite the formal exemption of medical supplies from sanctions, the need to apply to 
the UN sanctions committee in New York for permission to import supplies led to an acute shortage 
of medicines in hospitals, although some could be bought in private pharmacies (Kazic 2001).  
The health status of the population deteriorated dramatically in the 1990s, due to economic 
transition and the direct and indirect consequences of war, with increased rates of adult mortal i ty 
and stagnating or falling life expectancy in several countries (Rechel and McKee 2003)(Rechel, 
Schwalbe et al. 2004). Since then, the region has experienced a surge in economic growth fol lowing 
democratic changes in Croatia and Serbia in 2000, and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the 
EU in 2007. Health indicators show encouraging trends, with life expectancy increasing across the 
region (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2 Life expectancy at birth, 1990-2010 
 
Source: WHO (2011) European Health for All database, July 2011 edition, Copenhagen: World Health 
Organization Regional Office for Europe 
Note: no recent data available for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
More detailed analyses will be required to establish how much of these improvements are  due to 
improvements in health systems. Dimova et al. argue in Chapter 3 of this volume that health reforms 
in Bulgaria failed to achieve reductions in the very high premature mortality among those aged 40 -
59 years, while death rates from circulatory system diseases in Bulgaria were the highest in the 
European Union in 2008. This indicates substantial scope for health system interventions, in 
particular those related to public health and lifestyle changes, but also with regard to treatment of  
hypertension and stroke.  
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Conclusion 
Health reforms throughout Central and Eastern Europe have often been driven more by political 
pressures and ideology than by research evidence on the effectiveness of different approaches 
(Rechel and McKee 2009). This is equally true of the transition countries of South East Europe. The 
widespread (re-)introduction of social health insurance has led to gaps in coverage in several 
countries, and there is reason to ask whether it would have been better to switch to or retain a 
model based on general taxation and universal population coverage. Only Kosovo has moved in this 
direction, in part because of the large size of its informal economy, making it difficult to raise 
contributions from employers and employees (there is also no income tax for this reason). The 
widespread adoption of general practice at primary care level has also been questioned, and doubts 
raised as to whether the polyclinic model inherited by the communist countries behind the iron 
curtain or the model of community health centres bequeathed to the Yugoslav successor states was 
really as ineffective as suggested by foreign advisors in the 1990s (Rechel and McKee 2009; Rechel 
and McKee 2008). The disbandment of polyclinics and their replacement by general practitioners 
working in single practice goes against the grain of recent trends in the West towards group 
practices in primary care. Fortunately, the model of community health centres is still in place in 
several of the Yugoslav successor states. It can be developed and, if properly resourced and 
regulated, turned into a basis for the development of primary health care in the future.  
With the global plunge into economic crisis which began to affect the region in 2008, the  period of  
strong economic growth between 2000 and 2007 has come to an end, unemployment and poverty 
have started to rise again, and it can be expected that there will be adverse effects on the health of  
the population. As governments seek to reign in budget deficits and restrict public expenditure on 
health services, it is more important than ever that the countries of the region improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their health systems.  
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